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Where, how, who? Some questions for restorative justice 
 
Introduction 
 
The adoption of restorative justice in Britain has expanded greatly over the last decade, both in 
and outside the criminal justice system. Restorative justice has been seen as offering an 
unusual combination of benefits. It has appealed simultaneously to advocates of an enhanced 
role for victims in criminal justice, to believers in reducing reoffending by facilitating 
desistance, and to police forces committed to resolving problems of low-level disorder. It also, 
crucially, offers to deliver results in all these areas more quickly, less contentiously and 
(perhaps most important) at much less cost, in comparison to the conventional functioning of 
the criminal justice system. Since 2010 restorative justice has benefited further from the 
Coalition government’s restrictions on public spending, which put police forces and other 
agencies in the position of needing to do more with less. 
 
While this situation presents opportunities for ever-increasing numbers of people to benefit 
from restorative justice, it also prompts some questions, which will be set out in this paper. 
These are 
 
 Where does restorative justice fit within the criminal justice system? 
 How does restorative justice achieve its effects? and 
 Who is the beneficiary of restorative justice - and how can the process be managed so 
as to benefit both victims and offenders? 
 
This paper will argue that the answer to the third question - which also addresses the first two - 
can be found by adopting a regulatory perspective, and in particular by foregrounding concepts 
of interdependency. The needs of victims and offenders, while they may both be met through 
restorative justice, are so different that a process designed to meet one may be oppressive and 
unjust to the other. The participatory equality on which just outcomes depend requires the 
articulation of relations of interdependency between participants. 
 
Restorative justice: where? 
 
The first question to be asked is: where does restorative justice fit? At present in Britain, 
offenders and suspected offenders may be offered the option of restorative justice in several 
different settings. Restorative justice may take place 
 
 without any criminal justice involvement (e.g. in schools) 
 as a stand-alone procedure administered or facilitated by the police, without any 
criminal charge being brought 
 accompanying a Young Person’s Caution, following an admission of guilt 
 as part, or all, of the conditions attached to a Conditional Caution, following an 
admission of guilt 
 as a procedure undertaken after a guilty plea or finding of guilt but before sentencing, 
pending a deferred sentencing decision or in the time allowed for pre-sentence 
reporting  
 as part, or all, of the conditions agreed with a young offender in a Referral Order, 
following a guilty plea or (at the discretion of the youth court) a finding of guilt 
 as the reparative element of the conditions imposed on an adult offender in a 
Community Order, following a guilty plea or a finding of guilt 
 as a stand-alone procedure offered to convicted offenders serving a sentence, without 
any necessary effect on the sentence 
 
This is not an exhaustive list. While most - or all - of these forms of restorative justice may 
seem familiar and unexceptional, the range they cover is worth commenting on. An abstract 
model of criminal justice would look something like this: after a crime is committed, a suspect 
is charged and given the opportunity either to admit guilt or to plead not guilty and stand trial; 
following a guilty plea or a guilty verdict, the suspect is sanctioned (convicted) and subjected 
to a penalty. Viewed in this light, restorative justice is being offered 
 
 when no crime has been committed 
 after an admission of guilt, replacing a criminal sanction 
 after a sanction, replacing part or all of a penalty 
 as a penalty 
 in addition to a penalty 
 
It is difficult to see how the same group of approaches to conflict resolution can convey such 
different messages in such different settings, ranging from informal and non-punitive 
resolution of non-criminal problems through to the formal punishment of crime. Punishment 
and restoration can be brought closer together if we assume that the rationale of punishment 
should not be the infliction of pain but communication - “an attempt to bring offenders to 
recognize the wrongs they have committed, and the need to make appropriate reparation for 
them” (Duff 2010: 302). Even on this basis, though, there is surely a crucial difference 
between the wrongs committed by an offender who has been found guilty in court and one who 
has broken no law. The underlying concern is that restorative justice may be adopted with 
multiple different goals in mind. Given the evident cost savings to be had from adopting 
restorative justice - suggesting that the diffusion of restorative justice will continue - this poses 
risks for the future of restorative justice, as practitioner expertise and organisational knowledge 
develop. On one hand, restorative justice may evolve into a variety of different practices with 
only the name in common; alternatively, it may end up serving some purposes well and others 
badly, with consequent costs to some groups who should ostensibly be benefiting from it. 
  
Two main answers to this critique are available. It could be argued that even to think of 
restorative justice as an identifiable group of approaches would overstate the unity of the 
phenomena: perhaps the different forms of restorative justice are linked only by the kind of 
family resemblances that link together a game of Monopoly, a game of football and a game of 
poker (Wittgenstein 1953). However, the ‘family resemblance’ argument doesn’t dispose of 
the problem so much as suggesting a way to resolve it, which would involve adopting new and 
different labels for different forms of restorative justice - something for which practitioners 
have shown no enthusiasm. 
 
Alternatively and more ambitiously, it could be argued that viewing restorative justice in terms 
of criminal justice is the wrong starting point. In other words, perhaps the imperfect fit 
between restorative justice and existing criminal justice procedures merely reflects the 
idiosyncrasies of criminal justice, seen from the restorative standpoint; perhaps restorative 
goals and their achievement by restorative means are the primary reality, regardless of what 
relationship there is (if any) between the procedure and the criminal justice system. The 
argument for the primacy of restorative justice is persuasive to a point, but does not solve the 
problem so much as define it out of existence. Unless and until restorative justice supplants the 
criminal justice system altogether, the problem of the mismatch between the two paradigms 
will be practical as well as conceptual: if the same or similar restorative procedures are offered 
in punitive, non-punitive and non-criminal settings, the procedures will inevitably be inflected 
by the values associated with those settings, leading to confusion and distortion of the 
restorative goal. Of course, it could be argued that multiple different restorative goals are 
actually being sought in different contexts - so that ‘restorative justice as penalty’ would be a 
different process from ‘restorative justice with no crime’. However, this would simply return 
us to the ‘family resemblance’ argument. The relationship between restorative justice and 
criminal justice appears uncertain and unresolved. 
 
Restorative justice: how? 
 
This relates to the second major question: how does restorative justice work? Given the 
emphatic opposition drawn between restorative justice and criminal justice in much of the 
literature, it should be possible to identify the features that make a restorative procedure 
restorative. Is there a particular set of interactions which always takes place when restorative 
justice is being undertaken? Braithwaite has written extensively (1989, 1999, 2002) about 
‘reintegrative shaming’, the process whereby representatives of a community bring an offender 
to the point of feeling shame for his/her past offences, before symbolically readmitting him or 
her to the community and removing any stigma of deviancy. Reintegration is contrasted with 
the ‘degradation’, stigmatisation and outcasting enacted by the court process (Braithwaite and 
Mugford 1994, Garfinkel 1956). Reintegrative shaming functions as an interaction in three 
stages: first, the victim, supported by the community, charges the offender with a shameful act 
and induces the offender to feel shame; second, the offender expresses shame; third, the 
community, with the victim’s consent, assures the offender that he or she is accepted as a 
person, having taken responsibility for and condemned the shameful act. This model raises 
concerns (which Braithwaite acknowledges) about the capriciousness of actual communities, 
the potential for community judgments to be distorted by existing power relations and the 
operation of a tyranny of the (respectable) majority, and the possibility of offenders being 
subjected to burdensome and even stigmatising pressure in the cause of shaming. 
 
In the contemporary British context these issues can be largely set aside, however, as the 
research evidence suggests two much larger problems with implementing ‘reintegrative 
shaming’. First, readmittance to the community is not generally an observable outcome: “we 
only rarely saw reintegration into a ‘community’ ... This was not because restorative justice 
had ‘failed’ or was not reintegrative, but simply because a community in this sense did not 
exist” (Shapland et al 2006b: 521). Moreover, ‘the community’ tends not to be involved in 
restorative justice in any identifiable form: if anyone is involved other than the victim, the 
offender and a facilitator, it is almost invariably a relative or partner of the victim or offender. 
“What tended to be absent ... was any sense of the wider community, whether neighbours or 
people representing community organisations or groups. Hence supporters tended to have what 
we may call a ‘star’ relationship with the person whom they knew, with victims’ and 
offenders’ supporters generally being unknown to each other” (Shapland et al 2006a: 50) The 
presence of any kind of figure of informal authority within the community, to whom both the 
victim and offender could be expected to defer, is more or less unknown. This creates obvious 
difficulties for any kind of ceremony of readmittance to the community. (Both victim and 
offender could be expected to defer to the police, who are often involved in the role of 
facilitator; however, deriving informal ‘community’ authority from this source would be a 
double confusion of roles, between facilitator and participant and between moral and coercive 
authority.) 
 
Secondly, the evidence suggests that the three-stage model of reintegrative shaming can rarely 
be observed, even when a meeting has been set up in such a way as to facilitate it. Expressions 
of disapproval for the offence and support for the offender have been observed, but with little 
or no correlation between the two (Shapland et al 2006a: 59); this suggests that the conferences 
did not proceed from disapproval of the offence to equally emphatic assurances that the 
offender was a good person rather than a stigmatised deviant - the crucial third stage of 
reintegrative shaming. It may be that this sort of public statement is ‘un-British’ in its 
effusiveness (Shapland et al 2006a: 54). Alternatively, the explanation may lie, again, in the 
absence of the network of horizontal social ties which would constitute a community; without 
this, the victim is unlikely either to know the offender well enough to form an opinion, or to be 
under any sort of social obligation to give the offender a good reference. 
 
Another candidate for the key mechanism of restorative justice is the apology. Apologies, or 
encouragements to apologise, have a much stronger claim to universality. Restorative justice 
conference scripts typically cue the offender’s apology fairly heavily. In less formal settings 
such as police-administered “street RJ”, even the niceties of a prompt such as “Is there 
anything you’d like to say to the victim at this point?” may be dispensed with in favour of a 
blunt “Are you going to say ‘Sorry’?”. Bottoms (2003) argues that a ‘fully-accomplished 
apology’ can change the relationship between victim and offender by reconfiguring their past 
and present identities. By apologising, in effect, the offender condemns his or her past self; by 
accepting the apology, the victim establishes a relationship with the offender in the present, 
replacing the previous (injured or vengeful) relationship with the offender’s past self. The 
fully-accomplished apology is a small-scale and less ambitious version of reintegrative 
shaming. Rather than emerging from the encounter de-stigmatised and positively welcomed 
into a community, the offender ends up free from the threat of revenge, and in a neutral and 
non-threatening relationship with the victim (or no relationship at all). 
 
The question then is, firstly, whether this simple mechanism is the motor that drives restorative 
justice: even in its most ambitious forms, is restorative justice fundamentally about creating a 
situation where an offender is willing to apologise and a victim to accept the apology? This is a 
loaded question, as there are certainly many examples of restorative justice which do fit this 
minimal template. If the answer is negative - if there is more going on, at least some of the 
time - we shall be committed either to disqualifying the more basic forms of restorative justice 
or to adopting the ‘family resemblance’ model, and conceding that restorative justice is not a 
single concept. 
 
Secondly, approaching the same problem from another angle, we can ask whether a 
‘fully-accomplished apology’ is achieved, or even realistically aimed for, across all the 
different procedures used to implement restorative justice and all the different settings in which 
it takes place. Can an apology be ‘accomplished’ if the victim is absent, and the police stand in 
for him or her? if the victim is collective or symbolic, as in some cases of vandalism and anti-
social behaviour? if the victim is present but not the offender, and apologies are received in 
writing? This is separate from the question of whether, in practice, offenders volunteer an 
apology which is accepted, let alone whether the apology is accepted as sincere. Data from the 
conferences analysed by Shapland et al suggest that the vast majority of offenders do apologise 
(90%) and that the majority of apologies (68%) are felt to be sincerely given (Shapland et al 
2007: 23-5). Intriguingly, 85% of victims in these conferences reported that they were either 
‘very satisfied’ or ‘quite satisfied’ with the conference, despite the fact that 28% believed that 
the offender was not sincere (‘No’ or ‘Not really’); a significant minority of victims seem to 
have been satisfied with the process, despite not believing that the apology they received was 
sincere (Shapland et al 2007: 27, 24). 
 
Restorative justice: who? 
 
At this stage, it seems reasonable to assume that restorative justice does stand for a single 
identifiable approach to conflict resolution - albeit one which may be pulled in different 
directions by its different points of implantation in the criminal justice system - and that its 
central procedural mechanism is an interaction between victim and offender which culminates 
in a ‘fully accomplished apology’. (Depending how tightly an interaction is defined, this may 
put a question mark over some practices currently classed as ‘restorative justice’ - shuttle 
mediation and the written apology in particular. It is noticeable that these are not the forms of 
restorative justice which appear to be most popular or most effective.) 
 
This prompts a third question: not how restorative justice works, but for whom. Advocates of 
restorative justice sometimes give the impression of dismissing this question with assurances 
that restorative justice is good for everyone (e.g. Braithwaite 1999): the victim is restored to 
the sense of self-worth, personal security and ‘dominion’ which he or she enjoyed before the 
crime; the offender is restored to a state free of stigma and unburdened by guilt or fear of 
revenge; and the community is restored to wholeness through the reknitting of social 
relationships, made possible both by the reacceptance of the offender and by the removal of the 
victim’s burden of injury and/or vindictiveness. 
 
As we have already seen, there is room for doubt as to whether the third mechanism operates, 
at least in the British experience of restorative justice. The notion of community should not be 
dismissed outright The existence of an active community is not a binary condition but the 
result of a combination of social interactions; the notion that initiating restorative practices in a 
‘fainting’ community might be the ‘vitaliser’ that community needs is credible 
(Christie 1977: 12). In practice, as Bottoms notes, there has been little evidence of restorative 
justice playing this role in the years since Christie advanced this hopeful argument 
(Bottoms 2003: 82). Rather, restorative justice has developed in Britain in the absence of 
strong communities or informal moral authorities, and consequently has focused entirely on 
the restorative effects of the victim-offender interaction. 
 
This leaves two possible beneficiaries: victims and offenders. The 85% satisfaction rate among 
victims noted above is matched by an 80% satisfaction rate among offenders (Shapland et al 
2007: 27). Although this is encouraging, it is not conclusive; in particular, it does not tell us in 
what way the experience of restorative justice benefited the participants, and consequently 
cannot tell us whether it benefited them in the way that restorative justice theory would predict. 
To take an extreme example, the members of the notorious Australian sentencing group who 
“enthusiastically” sentenced a young offender to wear a sign identifying him as a thief appear 
to have found this exercise in stigmatisation satisfying (Braithwaite 1999: 97); this is not to say 
that it was any more restorative an experience for them than it was for the offender. 
 
What, then, is the benefit which restorative justice offers - or should offer - to victims and 
offenders - and is the benefit the same for both sides? Certainly the two are both dealing with 
the consequences of the same offence; in this respect the metaphor of restoration is temptingly 
flexible, suggesting that the clock can simply be wound back to a time before the problematic 
event, freeing both parties of their respective burdens. However, since time cannot be rewound, 
the metaphor cannot be a useful guide to what actually needs to be done. Perhaps the furthest 
the commonality between victim and offender can be pushed is to say that both will benefit 
from ceasing to define themselves in terms of the offence, and that this change can - perhaps - 
be brought about or hastened through restorative justice. 
 
Framing it in these terms, however, highlights the differences between the two experiences. 
For the offender, the offence is an act that he or she undertook, either impulsively (violence, 
vandalism) or deliberately (violence, theft). In one case, the act was gratifying, an end in itself; 
in the other, it was a means to a desirable end (e.g. getting money). To move beyond the 
offence it will be necessary either for the offender either to cease taking gratification from 
mpulsive offending or to stop using criminal means to achieve his or her ends. Either of these 
patterns of offending behaviour will be supported by rationalisations and neutralisations; they 
may also be sedimented as a lifestyle and validated by the offender’s social circle. 
 
To disown even a first offence may involve substantial psychological adjustments and the 
abandonment of previously functional neutralisations (or, perhaps more realistically, their 
replacement with alternative neutralisations, permitting the offender to maintain his or her 
sense of a continuing identity while supporting law-compliant behaviour in the present). To 
abandon offending behaviour which is undertaken habitually and validated socially - and on 
which the offender may have become financially dependent - is necessarily a much larger 
undertaking: not so much a leap of faith as a trek. 
 
For offenders, then, restorative justice is of value primarily insofar as it forms part of a 
movement of desistance, either awakening a desire to desist or - less spectacularly - validating 
the desire and helping the offender continue the development of a desisting sense of self. As 
Shapland et al write, “in order to agree sincerely to participate in restorative justice at all, 
offenders have to be at least on the cusp of trying to desist ... The conference itself, however, 
could provide an extra boost. Much of what was discussed in conferences was what could be 
called ‘desistance talk’” (Shapland et al 2008: 42). How effective restorative justice actually is 
in this respect is still largely unproven, owing to a variety of practical and measurement-related 
issues. However, both the process of reintegrative shaming and the smaller-scale interaction of 
the ‘fully-accomplished apology’ are very much in line with the conceptualisation of 
desistance as driven by a sense of personal redemption and ‘making good’ (Maruna 2001). 
 
For the victim, by contrast, the offence is a harm done, in three distinct but related senses. 
There is the actual harm, physical, material or financial - the setback to the victim’s interests. 
Secondly, there is the harm done to the victim’s autonomy and ability to organise his or her life 
- the qualities described by Braithwaite and Pettit as ‘dominion’, considered as a condition of 
‘resilient non-interference’ (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, Pettit and Braithwaite 1993). It is 
definitive of a crime, for the victim, that it is unexpected and potentially overpowering; to fear 
crime, on a continuing basis, is to live with an ever-present threat of an incursion that cannot 
be resisted, which is to say, to live without any sense of security. The fear of crime and the loss 
of security thus necessarily results in a drastically diminished sphere of effective freedom of 
action. Thirdly, there is the harm - even less tangible but equally real - done to the victim’s 
dignity and sense of self by the experience of being the object of an illegal act. To be a victim 
of crime, in this sense, is to suffer the effects of something that should not have been allowed 
to happen. To put it another way, to be a citizen - a legal subject - is to have the right to 
security from harm; to be harmed is to have one’s rights momentarily annulled, to cease to be a 
legal subject and become an object to be harmed or plundered. 
 
Clearly, helping victims of crime to recover from this triple harm - material harm, harm to 
dominion, harm to subjecthood - is a very different proposition from an offender moving on 
from a pattern of voluntarily-undertaken behaviour, and it is not intuitively obvious that an 
interaction which assists one process will also assist the other. That said, an apology may have 
the merits of conveying respect for the victim as a person and the assurance that the victim is 
under no continuing threat; as such, it may be the message that the victim needs to hear in 
order to leave the effects of the offence behind, just as the acceptance of the apology is a 
message the offender needs to hear in order to begin to leave behind the habit of offending. 
 
At this point in the argument, two opposite dangers loom. On one hand, there is a risk of 
instrumentalising victims. If restorative justice does consistently promote desistance, can we 
also expect it to serve the needs of victims? Does the association between restorative justice 
and desistance narratives risk placing victims ‘in the service of offenders’ (Ashworth 
2000: 168)? This is unsatisfactory both to advocates of judicial due process and to enthusiasts 
for victims’ rights, who argue that the victim’s narrative should be at the centre of society’s 
response to crime, rather than being relegated to the status of a witness statement. 
 
On the other hand, if we take the role and the needs of victims as primary, there is the danger 
of instrumentalising offenders. The humanistic values of restorative justice should rein in any 
victims who take satisfaction from the stigmatisation - disintegrative shaming - of ‘their’ 
offender. The danger remains that the moral suasion exerted by the restorative interaction, 
prior to the apology being offered, may be experienced as stressful or humiliating, and that the 
apology may be offered as an expression of defeat, and in the hope of bringing the ordeal to an 
end. This is a particular concern in cases where the offending behaviour is well supported by 
habit and neutralisation, and where a lack of direct harm makes simple moral appeals 
unavailable. A graffiti artist, for example, may firmly believe that the offending behaviour is 
harmless, even positively valuable in its exhibition of skill and creativity; in a situation like 
this, efforts to induce shame may be oppressive, however supportive an apology would be for 
the victim’s sense of autonomy and dignity. 
 
Conclusion: justice through regulation? 
 
The suggestion is, in other words, that the fully accomplished apology - with the processes of 
restorative justice which help to produce it - is an interaction which can meet the needs both of 
victims of crime wishing to overcome its effects and offenders who are ready to desist from 
crime. That said, the needs of the two groups are distinct, and it should not be assumed that 
both can be met by the same procedure; the possibility of a restorative justice procedure having 
restorative effects for one side but not the other must be kept in mind. 
 
The question then is, finally, how this possibility can be averted. A clue may be offered by the 
regulatory framework within which Braithwaite situates restorative justice, and in particular 
the concept of interdependency. Braithwaite argues that restorative justice can function as a 
way for a community to regulate itself. The model is derived from business, where 
organisations can be effectively regulated using informal procedures which trade on a sense of 
shame while avoiding formal prosecution: thus Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) demonstrated a 
correlation between effectiveness in the regulation of old people’s homes and the use of 
reintegrative shaming by the regulators. 
 In the regulatory framework for the management of deviant behaviour, representatives of a 
community call troublesome individuals to account; the latter, once persuaded to feel ashamed 
of their actions, agree to behave in a more orderly way in the name of the shared values of the 
community. While the notion of community may be difficult to put into practice, as noted 
earlier, the concept of interdependency makes it more concrete. Braithwaite defines 
interdependencies as “attachments which invoke personal obligation to others within a 
community of concern” (Braithwaite 1989: 85); to the extent that people are connected by 
interdependencies, they will each have obligations to one another. 
 
Significantly, as well as demonstrating the effectiveness of reintegrative shaming, Makkai and 
Braithwaite’s 1994 study showed this approach to be particularly effective in a context of 
interdependency between regulator and regulated. We can suggest on this basis that regulation, 
and hence restorative justice, is at its best - and has the least potential to deliver unjust 
outcomes - when it is embarked on after the establishment or recognition of a genuine 
relationship of interdependency, and a common interest grounded in it. In the context of 
restorative justice, the more that victims and offenders recognise each other as being 
interdependent in some way, the more each will be motivated to meet the others’ needs 
through the restorative process as well as using it to meet their own. 
 
This is, perhaps, another way of approaching the question of equality of arms within the 
restorative process. Christie argues that when an offender faces a victim representative “with a 
limited amount of personal interest in the conflict”, the outcome is a foregone conclusion: 
agreement between victim and offender degenerates into punishment. The situation would be 
different, he argues, 
 
if the mediators on the boards were able to include the top management of the big firm 
or of the subway system or the municipality. In that case it would be possible to raise 
questions about how the shops are organised, if the temptations in the shop are 
exhibited in such a way that makes them close to irresistible to youngsters ... Or the 
question might be raised if the graffiti on the wall was not more beautiful and/or 
interesting than the huge advertisements for underwear? 
(Christie 2004: 81-2). 
 
What is significant about these - perhaps utopian - examples is that they bring out the 
dependency of the victim on the offender (as customer, as future citizen) as well as the 
dependency of offender on victim. In the absence of any kind of articulation of 
interdependency - when the restorative process brings a shoplifter together with a security 
guard, or pits concerned citizens against suspected vandals - there can be no equality within the 
process; in these conditions just results are not likely to be achieved. 
 
Restorative justice is a mechanism for collective self-regulation rather than for any kind of 
fact-finding or ascription of blame: this regulatory foundation may be the ultimate reason for 
the lack of fit between restorative justice and criminal justice (Braithwaite 2002). At the same 
time, it is defined by a commitment to delivering justice, and not merely restoration: a process 
which restored the status quo before a crime by cementing exploitative and unequal relations 
would be unsatisfactory, even if the participants were happy with it. 
 
The aspirations of restorative justice advocates to give a voice to an active local community, as 
well as to individual victims and offenders, cannot work where such a community does not 
exist; the success of restorative justice in Britain to date has largely been achieved without any 
‘community’ participation. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that restorative justice has an 
inherent tendency to promote communities; undertaken without the establishment of 
relationships of interdependency, it is liable to do little more than ‘restore’ participants to their 
place within existing inequalities and relations of power. That said, if the articulation of 
relationships of interdependency does promote the achievement of just results - and the 
restoration of both victims and offenders - then the promotion of the conditions for restorative 
justice may turn out to be the vitaliser for a revived active community.  
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